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Abstract
Silbert and Thomas (2013) showed that failures of decisional separability are not, in
general, identifiable in fully parameterized 2×2 Gaussian GRT models. A recent exten-
sion of 2× 2 GRT models (GRTwIND) was developed to solve this problem and a con-
ceptually similar problem with the simultaneous identifiability of means and marginal
variances in GRT models. Central to the ability of GRTwIND to solve these problems
is the assumption of universal perception, which consists of shared perceptual distri-
butions modified by attentional and global scaling parameters (Soto et al., 2015). If
universal perception is valid, GRTwIND solves both issues. In this paper, we show that
GRTwIND with universal perception and subject-specific failures of decisional separa-
bility is mathematically, and thereby empirically, equivalent to a model with decisional
separability and failure of universal perception. We then provide a formal proof of the
fact that means and marginal variances are not, in general, simultaneously identifiable
in 2 × 2 GRT models, including GRTwIND. These results can be taken to delineate
precisely what the assumption of universal perception must consist of. Based on these
results and related recent mathematical developments in the GRT framework, we pro-
pose that, in addition to requiring a fixed subset of parameters to determine the location
and scale of any given GRT model, some subset of parameters must be set in GRT mod-
els to fix the orthogonality of the modeled perceptual dimensions, a central conceptual
underpinning of the GRT framework. We conclude with a discussion of perceptual
primacy and its relationship to universal perception.
Keywords: General Recognition Theory, identifiability, testability, GRTwIND,
decisional separability
1. Introduction
Recent work within the general recognition theory (GRT) indicates that failures
of decisional separability are not generally identifiable under common assumptions
(Silbert and Thomas, 2013; Thomas and Silbert, 2014), and it has long been known that
the latent perceptual means and marginal variances are not, in general, simultaneously
identifiable in GRT models (e.g., Wickens, 1992). A recently developed multilevel
extension of GRT (GRT with Individual Differences, or GRTwIND) has been proffered
as a solution to both of these problems (Soto et al., 2015; Soto and Ashby, 2015). In this
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theoretical note, we show that any GRTwIND model exhibiting failures of decisional
separability or non-unit marginal variances is mathematically, and thereby empirically,
equivalent to a model the exhibits neither trait. GRTwIND solves these two problems
only conditionally, if the assumption of of universal perception is valid, but the validity
of universal perception cannot be established within GRTwIND. The purpose of this
note is, in no small part, to establish precisely, and mathematically, what the assumption
of universal perception entails.
It is important at the outset to mention a subtle distinction relating to the notion of
identifiability. Specifically, in this paper we will distinguish between identifiability and
testability. For the present purposes, identifiability concerns the mapping between par-
ticular parameter values and observable data given a particular model.1 A set of param-
eters is identifiable if, given a particular model, distinct parameter values map uniquely
to corresponding data. On the other hand, testability concerns the relationship between
the assumptions underlying a model and the model’s empirical consequences. The un-
derlying assumptions of a model are testable if relaxation of these assumptions leads
to distinct empirical predictions.2 Although both identifiability and testability concern
the assumptions and empirical consequences of a model, the two ideas are not coexten-
sive. We show below that there are substantial testability problems in GRTwIND, and
we return to these issues periodically throughout the text as they relate to the material
at hand.
We begin, in section 2, by briefly reviewing the structure of the 2×2 Gaussian GRT
model and two extensions of this model (the concurrent ratings and n × m idenfication
models, with n,m > 2; Ashby, 1988; Wickens and Olzak, 1989, 1992).3 In section
3, we briefly recapitulate Silbert & Thomas’s (2013) proposition i, which describes
(a subset of) the relationships between failures of decisional separability, perceptual
separability, and perceptual independence. We also recapitulate Soto et al.’s (2015)
generalization of this proposition as it relates to models with multiple decision bounds
on each dimension.
In section 4, we describe the GRTwIND model and discuss its relationship to the
concurrent ratings and n × m models. In section 5, we discuss the logic of testabil-
ity with respect to Silbert & Thomas’s proposition i and the assumption of universal
perception in GRTwIND. We then show, through a minor generalization of proposition
i, that any GRTwIND model with subject-specific failures of decisional separability is
mathematically and empirically equivalent to a model in which decisional separabil-
ity holds and in which the assumption of universal perception does not. In section 6,
we give a proof of a frequently stated, but, to the best of our knowledge, not formally
proven empirical equivalence between mean and marginal variance parameters in 2× 2
Gaussian GRT models. The generalization of proposition i in section 5 and the proof
of mean-variance equivalence in section 6 together help delineate precisely what the
1That is, under the assumption that the the functional form of the model and the probabilistic assumptions
of the data and model parameters are true
2Our notion of testability is closely related to the notion of structural identifiability (e.g. Bellman and
strm, 1970; Eisenfeld, 1985).
3Henceforth, we will use n × m to refer exclusively to identification models with more than 2 levels on
each dimension.
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assumption of universal perception consists of and show that this assumption is not
testable with GRTwIND and associated identification-confusion data.
Finally, we discuss more general issues about the mapping between physical di-
mensions and modeled psychological dimensions in GRT. We propose that, in addition
to the necessity of fixing the location and scale of GRT models, the dimensional orthog-
onality of GRT models must be fixed, as well. We argue, following Silbert and Thomas
(2013), that this is typically best done by assuming decisional separability, though we
also discuss other possible approaches, noting that the scope of this assumption in
single-subject identification and concurrent ratings models is straightforward, whereas
it is somewhat less so in multilevel models like GRTwIND and the models described by
Silbert (2012, 2014). We conclude with a brief discussion of the relationship between
universal perception and the concept of perceptual primacy.
2. General Recognition Theory
2.1. GRT fundamentals
GRT is a two-stage model of perception and response selection (Ashby and Townsend,
1986; Kadlec and Townsend, 1992; Thomas, 2001b; Silbert, 2014; Wickens, 1992).
The first stage consists of noisy perception. The second stage consists of determin-
istic response selection. Noisy perception is modeled with multivariate probability
distributions defined over an unobserved perceptual space. Response selection is mod-
eled with decision bounds, i.e., curves that exhaustively partition the perceptual space
into response regions. Any given perceptual effect is represented as a point in percep-
tual space. The response to a perceptual effect is determined by the response region
in which the perceptual effect occurs. The probability of a particular response to a
particular stimulus is modeled as the multiple integral of the perceptual distribution
corresponding to the stimulus over an appropriate response region.
2.2. The 2 × 2 model
The most common use of GRT is to analyze identification-confusion data in a 2× 2
factorial paradigm, wherein the stimuli consist of the factorial combination of two lev-
els on each of two dimensions (e.g., Ashby and Townsend, 1986; Silbert, 2012, 2014;
Thomas, 2001b,a). For example, a factorial combination of frequency and intensity
could produce a set of stimulus tones that are low or high frequency and low or high
intensity. In this case the four stimuli would be A1B1 = low frequency, low inten-
sity; A1B2 = low frequency, high intensity; A2B1 = high frequency, low intensity; and
A2B2 = high frequency, high intensity.
Figure 1 illustrates the equal likelihood contours and decision bounds of one possi-
ble 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model. The levels of the stimuli and corresponding response
regions are indicated by aib j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2};4 ai indicates the level on the x di-
mension (e.g., low vs high frequency) and b j indicates the level on the y dimension
4Uppercase AiB j indicate the levels of the stimuli and corresponding perceptual distributions, while low-
ercase aib j indicate response levels.
3
(e.g., low vs high intensity). The vertical decision bound, cx, partitions the x-axis, and
the horizontal bound, cy, partitions the y-axis. Together, they specify response regions
corresponding to the same factorial structure that defines the stimuli.
Figure 1: 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT example illustration.
This model illustrates the three dimensional interaction concepts defined in the
GRT framework: perceptual independence (PI), perceptual separability (PS), and de-
cisional separability (DS). With Gaussian perceptual distributions, PI is equivalent to
zero correlation, and failure of PI is equivalent to non-zero correlation. The top two
perceptual distributions illustrate failure of PI, while the bottom two exhibit PI. PS is
illustrated with respect to the y dimension. The perceptual distributions are perfectly
horizontally aligned at each level of B j; the marginal distributions of perceptual effects
on the y dimension do not vary as a function of the level on the x dimension. By way of
contrast, PS fails with respect to the x dimension; the marginal perceptual distributions
on this dimension vary across levels of the y dimension. Finally, because the decision
bounds are parallel to the coordinate axes, DS holds in this model. Decision bounds
that are not parallel to the coordinate axes would represent a failure of DS.
2.3. Multi-bound extensions of the model
Although the 2× 2 Gaussian model is the most commonly used GRT model (along
with the associated factorial identification experimental paradigm), extensions of this
model were developed shortly after GRT was defined as such. The concurrent ratings
4
model (Ashby, 1988; Wickens and Olzak, 1989, 1992) and the n × m model (with
n,m > 2) were two of the first extensions of GRT, and both play an important role here.
A concurrent ratings model is illustrated in Figure 2. The structure of this model is
very similar to the 2 × 2 model illustrated in Figure 1, with the key difference that the
concurrent ratings model has two or more decision bounds on each dimension.
Concurrent rating models are used to analyze judgments given separately to each
component (dimension) of the stimulus.5 Crucially for our purposes, the number of
response levels can be greater than those that define the stimuli. For example, exper-
iment participants may give ratings on a k-point scale indicating, on each dimension,
the degree to which a stimulus is judged to have been at a low or high value. The model
illustrated in Figure 2 could be used to analyze data in which subjects could respond,
e.g., ‘low’, ’uncertain’, or ’high.’
Figure 2: A concurrent ratings model with two (parallel) decision bounds on each dimension.
We refer to a closely related extension of GRT as the n × m model. Like the 2 × 2
model discussed above, the n × m model is used to analyze identification data, but like
the concurrent ratings model, the n×m model has multiple decision bounds on each di-
mension. The key difference between the concurrent ratings and n×m model is that the
latter has perceptual distributions corresponding to each response region. For example,
5Strictly speaking, ‘concurrent’ refers to separate responses on each dimension, while ’ratings’ refers to
multiple response levels on each dimension.
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the n×m model has been used to model data from participants’ identification of stimuli
consisting of the factorial combination of three levels on each of two dimensions (e.g.,
Ashby and Lee, 1991; Thomas et al., 2015).
The 2 × 2, n × m, and concurrent ratings models were each originally designed
to analyze a single subject’s data (Ashby and Lee, 1991; Thomas, 2001b,a; Wickens
and Olzak, 1989). Although the concurrent ratings and n × m model are distinct, for
the present analyses we introduce the term multi-bound model, which we will use to
refer to both types of model in order to distinguish them as a class distinct from the
standard 2 × 2 model. It is of central importance to the present analysis that multi-
bound models predict, and the data from associated tasks may contain, responses at
intermediate levels, where in the 2 × 2 identification identification paradigm, the data
and model predictions consist only of ‘low’ or ‘high’ responses.
2.4. Multilevel extensions of the model
Two recent extensions of GRT have focused on the simultaneous analysis of multi-
ple subjects’ data. One of these extensions is a Bayesian model in which each subject’s
data is fit to a standard 2 × 2 model, while, simultaneously, the individual subjects’
parameters are modeled as random variables governed by group-level parameters (Sil-
bert, 2012, 2014). The other extension is GRTwIND, in which a group-level set of
parameters are shared as well as partially modified and complemented by subject-level
parameters (Soto et al., 2015; Soto and Ashby, 2015). We refer to these models as mul-
tilevel to distinguish them as a class distinct from models designed to analyze a single
subject’s data.
It is important to note that multi-bound and multilevel models are not mutually ex-
clusive classes. Both the Bayesian multilevel model and GRTwIND could, in principle,
be implemented as concurrent ratings or n×m models. As it happens, neither have been
so implemented thus far, so, in practice, no multi-bound GRT models are multilevel,
and no multilevel GRT models are multi-bound.
The distinction between multi-bound and multilevel models helps elucidate the
scope of Silbert & Thomas’s proposition i and Soto et al.’s generalization thereof.
Specifically, Silbert and Thomas (2013) show that DS, PS, and PI are not simulta-
neously testable in single-subject 2 × 2 identification-confusion models. More specifi-
cally, they show that the parameters are not identifiable in a fully general Gaussian GRT
model (i.e., a model in which DS, PS, and PI may all fail). Soto et al. (2015) generalize
proposition i to show that this is also true of two-dimensional Gaussian GRT models
with multiple bounds on each dimension if and only if the bounds on a given dimension
are parallel.6 Soto et al. infer that neither proposition i nor their generalization thereof
apply to GRTwIND. We show below that this is incorrect.
In the following section, we briefly recapitulate, for convenience, the proof of pro-
postion i.7 We also recapitulate Soto et al.’s generalization of this proposition.
6Neither Silbert and Thomas (2013) nor Soto et al. (2015) distinguish between identifiability and testa-
bility as we use the terms here, in both cases discussing these issues exclusively in terms of identifiability.
7We focus here on the non-testability of DS in 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT models with linear decision bounds.
Although we do not address other types of decision bounds here (e.g., piecewise linear bounds), we see no
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3. Recapitulation of Silbert and Thomas (2013), proposition i, and Soto et al.’s
generalization thereof
Silbert and Thomas (2013) showed that single-subject 2× 2 Gaussian GRT models
with linear decision bounds that are not parallel to the coordinate axes can be linearly
transformed to align the decision bounds with the coordinate axes. Hence, every single-
subject 2×2 Gaussian GRT model with linear decision bounds exhibiting failure of DS
is empirically equivalent to a single-subject 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model in which DS
holds. By way of contrast, models exhibiting failures of perceptual separability are not,
in general, empirically equivalent to models in which perceptual separability holds.8
Mathematically, Silbert and Thomas (2013) showed that a model with angle φ be-
tween cy and the x-axis and angle ω between cx and cy can be rotated and sheared by
applying the following two linear transformations9:
R =
[
cos φ − sin φ
sin φ cos φ
]
(1)
S =
[
1 − 1tanω
0 1
]
(2)
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate how a model with linear failure of DS can be rotated
(via R) and sheared (via S) to induce DS. Figure 3 illustrates a model exhibiting linear
failure of DS, wherein the horizontal decision bound cy deviates from the x axis by the
angle φ, and the two decision bounds are separated by the angle ω.
Application of the rotation R aligns cy with the x-axis, producing the model illus-
trated in Figure 4. The angle ω between cx and cy is preserved by the rotation. Appli-
cation of the shear transformation S preserves the alignment of cy with the x-axis and
aligns cx with the y-axis, thereby inducing DS. Because these linear transformations
are invertible, the predicted response probabilities are preserved (Billingsley, 2012, pp.
215-216).
Silbert and Thomas (2013) provide a formal proof of their proposition i, which
states that, with linear decision bounds and a single-subject 2×2 Gaussian GRT model,
“any perceptually separable but decisionally nonseparable configuration can be trans-
formed to a configuration that is perceptually nonseparable, decisionally separable,
and equivalent with respect to predicted response probabilities.” Silbert and Thomas
(2013) focus on the case with PS and failure of DS in order to illustrate how closely
related these two notions of dimensional interaction are. However, they also note that
the proposition is readily generalized to include models that do not exhibit PS prior to
rotation and/or shear transformations.
reason to think that they would resolve this issue if implemented in GRTwIND. Silbert and Thomas (2013)
show, via simulation, that the same basic issue exists in 2 × 2 models with piecewise linear bounds. It will
be clear shortly why these results also apply to GRTwIND.
8A special case in which PS may be induced by application of linear transformations (mean-shift inte-
grality) is given in proposition ii of Silbert and Thomas (2013) and clarified in Thomas and Silbert (2014).
9Note that, without loss of generality, the location of the model is fixed by putting the intersection of
the two decision bounds at the origin. The same rotation and shear transformations will induce DS in a
non-centered model, e.g., one in which the A1B1 perceptual distribution is fixed at the origin.
7
Figure 3: 2× 2 Gaussian GRT model exhibiting failure of DS. φ indicates the angle between the ‘horizontal’
decision bound cy and the x-axis. ω indicates the angle between the two decision bounds cx and cy.
8
Figure 4: Rotated 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model.
9
Figure 5: Sheared 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model.
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Soto et al. (2015) generalize proposition i from Silbert and Thomas (2013) and
prove that this result also holds for Gaussian GRT models with multiple, parallel deci-
sion bounds on each dimension. More specifically, as stated above, Soto et al. show
that proposition i holds in two-dimensional Gaussian GRT models with more than one
bound on each dimension if and only if the bounds on a given dimension are parallel.10
Based on this generalization, Soto et al. (2015) write that Silbert & Thomas’s propo-
sition i “is not generally true in GRT-wIND or any other model with more than one
bound per dimension. The non-identifiability of decisional separability arises in such
models only under very specific circumstances” (p. 108).11 They conclude, incorrectly,
that failures of DS are, in general, testable in GRTwIND.
Because GRTwIND is a multilevel 2 × 2 model, the decision bounds in GRTwIND
do not function as multiple bounds on the same dimension in the same way that the
decision bounds in a concurrent ratings or n × m model do; using the terminology
introduced above, GRTwIND is not a multi-bound model. Soto et al. are correct that
the transformations at the heart of proposition i cannot induce DS simultaneously for all
subjects. However, proposition i applies in a subject-specific manner, such that subject-
specific failures of DS in GRTwIND map one-to-one onto subject-specific rotation and
shear transformations. Any GRTwIND model with universal perception and subject-
specific failures of DS is mathematically and empirically equivalent to a transformed
GRTwIND model with DS for all subjects and violation of universal perception.
4. The structure of GRTwIND
GRTwIND is a multilevel, 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model that relies crucially on the
assumption of universal perception (Soto et al., 2015; Soto and Ashby, 2015). Soto et
al. write that “the model assumes that the structure of the perceptual distributions is the
same for all participants; that is, some aspects of perception are universal, in particular
the relations between dimensions within stimuli (covariance of each distribution) and
across stimuli (the means of each distribution and the ratio of their variance along a
dimension).... it is also assumed that attentional and decisional processes could vary
across individuals” (p. 91).
4.1. Group- and individual-level parameters
Mathematically, in GRTwIND there is a shared group-level set of four bivariate
Gaussian perceptual distributions. Each individual subject’s modeled perceptual dis-
tributions are modifications of the shared group-level distributions. In addition, each
individual subject has a set of linear decision bounds, each specified by an intercept
and a slope.
10To the best of our knowledge, it has not previously been noted that multi-bound models with non-parallel
bounds on a given dimension produces uninterpretable response regions, making them incoherent models of
perception and response selection. Consider, for example, the model illustrated in Figure 2 if cy1 and cy2
were not parallel. Because non-parallel lines intersect, this would produce a region that is simultaneously
above cy2 and below cy1 .
11Here ‘non-identifiability’ refers to non-testability, using the terminology established above.
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The group-level perceptual distribution for stimulus Ai, B j has a mean vector and
covariance matrix:
µAiB j =
[
µx,AiB j
µy,AiB j
]
(3)
ΣAiB j =
[
σxx,AiB j σxy,AiB j
σyx,AiB j σyy,AiB j
]
(4)
As in the the standard 2 × 2 and multi-bound models, the mean vector for one
distribution is set equal to (0, 0)T to fix the location of the model, and, as in multi-
bound models, the marginal variances in one distribution are set equal to one to fix the
scale of the model.12
For individual subject k, the covariance matrix corresponding to stimulus Ai, B j is
given by the following equation, with κk > 0 and 0 < λk < 1:
Σk,AiB j =

σxx,Ai B j
κkλk
σxy,Ai B j
κk
√
λk(1−λk)σyx,Ai B j
κk
√
λk(1−λk)
σyy,Ai B j
κk(1−λk)
 (5)
Note that, because the (absolute and relative) scaling is applied only to marginal
variances, subject k’s mean vector for stimulus AiB j is just the group-level mean vector:
µk,AiB j = µAiB j (6)
Note, too, that although Soto et al. (2015) state, in the quote above, that the covari-
ance of each distribution is constant, the scaling and dimension-weighting parameters
κk and λk ensure that this is not generally true. Rather, the assumption is that the cor-
relation of each distribution is constant across subjects.
More generally, it is clear that the assumption of universal perception allows for
scaling of marginal variances, both with respect to the absolute scale of the space (κ)
and with respect to the relative importance of each dimension (λ), but it does not allow
for differences in failures of PS or PI. Naturally enough, given that it is a constraint on
perceptual representations, universal perception also allows for differences with respect
to failures of DS across subjects.
4.2. GRTwIND, n × m, and concurrent ratings models
In two-dimensional, Gaussian GRT models, the predicted probability of response
aib j to stimulus AkBl is given by the following equation, expressed with some abuse of
notation in the interest of simplicity:
Pr(aib j|AkBl) =
¨
Raib j
N (2)
(
µAk Bl ,ΣAk Bl
)
dydx (7)
12It is typical in the standard 2× 2 model to set all marginal variances equal to one. We return to this issue
below.
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Here, N (2) (µ,Σ) indicates a bivariate Gaussian (normal) probability density func-
tion13 with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ, and the integration is taken over
the response region Raib j .
As discussed above, in a multi-bound model for a given subject’s data, a number of
the response regions are determined both by decision bounds above and below (on the
y-axis) and/or to the left and right (on the x axis) of the region. See, for example, the
response regions at the intermediate levels a2 or b2 in Figure 2 above. Corresponding
to this structure in the model, the data from a concurrent ratings or n ×m identification
task may contain responses at intermediate levels.
By way of contrast, no response region in the 2×2 GRTwIND model is determined
by more than one decision bound on a given dimension, and the data from the cor-
responding 2 × 2 task cannot, by definition, contain responses at intermediate levels.
From the perspective of subject k, the task is identical to the standard 2 × 2 factorial
identification task, whether his or her data will be analyzed by GRTwIND or not.
This distinction between GRTwIND and true multi-bound models is important for
understanding the scope of Silbert & Thomas’s proposition i and Soto et al.’s general-
ization of it. It follows directly from these results that failure of DS is not generally
testable in single-subject multi-bound models with parallel bounds on a given dimen-
sion. The rotation and shear transformations described by Silbert and Thomas (2013)
apply to the whole single-subject model. But it does not then follow from this fact that
failures of DS are, in general, testable in GRTwIND. In the next section, we show that
they are not.
5. Mathematical and empirical equivalence of GRTwIND with and without deci-
sional separability
5.1. The logic of testability in GRT
Before providing a formal demonstration of the fact that failures of DS are not, in
general, testable in GRTwIND models, we discuss some of the philosophical issues
underlying identifiability and testability.
As discussed above, Silbert and Thomas (2013) showed, in proposition i, that fail-
ures of DS are not testable in 2 × 2 GRT models. On the other hand, only a subset of
failures of PS and PI are not testable. They conclude that application of 2 × 2 GRT
models should rely on the assumption of DS. A researcher following their recommen-
dation would be able to test failures of PS and PI, and the parameters of a Gaussian
GRT model would be identifiable, conditional on the assumption that DS holds.
Now, consider the following logic: Suppose we assume that DS holds, and we fit a
2 × 2 GRT model and find that PS and PI fail. Can we conclude that PS and PI have
failed? It is the joint hypothesis of DS + PS + PI that has been rejected, but we do not
know unconditionally which antecedents are false. If our assumption that DS holds is
not valid, then our conclusions regarding the failure of PS and PI are incorrect. The set
of DS, PS, and PI together is not testable.
13In order to maintain consistenty with Silbert and Thomas (2013), we reserve φ to indicate the angle
between cy and the x-axis. Hence, we use N to indicate the normal (Gaussian) probability density function.
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The logic applies in an analogous manner to GRTwIND and the assumption of uni-
versal perception. Suppose we assume that universal perception holds, then we fit a
GRTwIND model and find that PS, PI, and/or DS fail. What can we conclude? In this
case, it is the joint hypothesis of universal perception + PS + PI + DS that has been
rejected, and, once again, we do not know unconditionally which antecedents are false.
If it is universal perception, then GRTwIND provides no basis for concluding that any
of the GRT interaction constructs have failed. Because of this, logically, GRTwIND
does not provide a general solution to the (identifiability and testability) problems dis-
cussed by Silbert and Thomas (2013). One can cover exactly the same data space with
GRTwIND or with a transformed version of GRTwIND in which DS holds and failures
of PS are allowed to vary across individuals.
In the following two sections, we prove that universal perception is not testable in
GRTwIND by virtue of the fact that proposition i implies that any GRTwIND model
with subject-specific failures of DS maps one-to-one onto a model with subject-specific
rotation and shear transformations in which DS holds across the board. This mathe-
matical equivalence delineates, in part, what the assumption of universal perception
consists of, and shows that a general solution to the identifiability and testability is-
sues in question will have to be non-mathematical and not dependent on the 2 × 2
identification-confusion data that GRTwIND was designed to model.
5.2. Subject-specific application of proposition i
GRTwIND as a whole is, like any other GRT model, invariant to affine transfor-
mations; the modeled perceptual and decisional space is not fixed with respect to any
absolute frame of reference. So, for example, rotation and/or shear transformations of a
full GRTwIND model (i.e., all shared and subject-specific parameters) would preserve
the full set of predicted response probabilities.
Soto et al. (2015) argue correctly that DS cannot, in general, be induced for all
subjects simultaneously in a GRTwIND model by the application of global rotation
and/or shear transformations. Their Figure 2 illustrates this fact. The argument is that,
although rotation and shear transformations applied to the full model can align sub-
ject m’s decision bounds with the coordinate axes, as long as other subjects’ decision
bounds are not parallel to subject m’s bounds, these transformation will not also align
the other subjects’ bounds with the coordinate axes.
However, applying single rotation and shear transformations to the full GRTwIND
model is not the only option at our disposal, nor is it a direct analog to rotation or shear
transformations of single-subject 2 × 2 or multi-bound models. This is because each
subject m’s decision bound slopes define subject-specific angles φm and ωm (see Figure
3), which define subject-specific rotation and shear matrices Rm and Sm. This im-
plies that universal perception and failure of decisional separability are not testable in
GRTwIND. That is, Silbert & Thomas’s proposition i applies directly to any GRTwIND
model with respect to each subject’s decision bounds.
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The rotated and sheared mean vector for stimulus AiB j for subject m is given by:
νm,AiB j = SmRmµAiB j (8)
= Sm
[
µx,AiB j cos φm − µy,AiB j sin φm
µx,AiB j sin φm + µy,AiB j cos φm
]
=
[
µx,AiB j cos φm − µy,AiB j sin φm − µx,AiB j cos φmtanωm + µy,AiB j
sin φm
tanωm
µx,AiB j sin φm + µy,AiB j cos φm
]
And the rotated and sheared covariance matrix for stimulus AiB j for subject m is
given by:
Ψm,AiB j = SmRmΣm,AiB j R
T
mS
T
m (9)
= SmΘm,AiB j S
T
m
Here, Σm,AiB j is subject m’s scaled covariance matrix, defined in equation 5 above,
and Rm and Sm are subject m’s rotation and shear matrices, respectively.
Keeping in mind that
(
Θm,AiB j
)
12
=
(
Θm,AiB j
)
21
(i.e., that Θm,AiB j is symmetric), the
elements of Θm,AiB j are:(
Θm,AiB j
)
11
=
σxx,AiB j
κmλm
cos2 φm − 2
σxy,AiB j
κm
√
λm(1 − λm)
sin φm cos φm +
σyy,AiB j
κm(1 − λm) sin
2 φm
(10)(
Θm,AiB j
)
12
=
(
σxx,AiB j
κmλm
− σyy,AiB j
κm(1 − λm)
)
cos φm sin φm +
σxy,AiB j
κm
√
λm(1 − λm)
(
cos2 φm − sin2 φm
)
(11)(
Θm,AiB j
)
22
=
σxx,AiB j
κmλm
sin2 φm + 2
σxy,AiB j
κm
√
λm(1 − λm)
sin φm cos φm +
σyy,AiB j
κm(1 − λm) cos
2 φm
(12)
And keeping in mind that
(
Ψm,AiB j
)
12
=
(
Ψm,AiB j
)
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(i.e., that Ψm,AiB j is symmetric),
the elements of Ψm,AiB j are:
(
Ψm,AiB j
)
11
=
(
Θm,AiB j
)
11
−
(
Θm,AiB j
)
12
1 + tanωm
tanωm
+
(
Θm,AiB j
)
22
tan2 ωm
(13)
(
Ψm,AiB j
)
12
=
(
Θm,AiB j
)
12
−
(
Θm,AiB j
)
22
tanωm
(14)(
Ψm,AiB j
)
22
=
(
Θm,AiB j
)
22
(15)
The formulas given in equations 8-15 are fairly cumbersome, but they are the result
of straightforward linear algebra operations. As noted above, subject m’s decision
bound slopes are mathematically equivalent to the angles φm and ωm, which in turn
determine Rm and Sm, so the rotated and sheared model has the same number of free
parameters as the specification of GRTwIND with non-zero decision bound slopes.
Indeed, the rotated and sheared model is a straightforward reparameterization of the
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GRTwIND model, not a more general model restricted to mimic a GRTwIND model.
Application of Rm and Sm to subject m’s parameters merely induces DS and transforms
the shared mean and covariance parameters in a subject-specific manner.
These invertible, linear transformations preserve the predicted response probabili-
ties of the model, so the GRTwIND model transformed by subject-specific rotation and
shear transformations is also empirically equivalent to the original model exhibiting
linear failures of DS.
Soto et al. (2015, p. 93) state that “if violations of decisional separability are found
and individual decision bounds have slightly different slopes, then it is not possible to
find an equivalent model (i.e., producing the same response probabilities) in which de-
cisional separability holds for all participants, unless the assumption of universal per-
ception is violated [emphasis added].” Expressed slightly differently, subject-specific
DS and shared PS and PI are only testable conditional on the validity of the assumption
of universal perception. In general, the conjunction of universal perception and DS
is not testable in GRTwIND, though, since relaxation of the assumption of universal
perception renders the model’s perceptual and decisional parameteres non-identifiable.
For every GRTwIND model, there is a mathematically and empirically equivalent
model that relies on very different assumptions about the nature of the underlying per-
ceptual and decisional interactions. We return to this issue again below.
6. Identifiability of means and marginal variances
The fact that means and marginal variances are not simultaneously identifiable in
the 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model was noted, in passing, more than 20 years ago (Wick-
ens, 1992). Intuitively, this makes sense as a straightforward multidimensional gener-
alization of the constraint on the unidimensional ‘presence’-‘absence’ signal detection
model, in which the variances of the noise and signal distributions are typically fixed
equal to one so that the difference between the means (i.e., d′) and a response bias pa-
rameter can both be estimated (Green and Swets, 1966). To the best of our knowledge,
however, no formal proof of this fact has been published. We provide such a proof here,
after which we discuss how this result further delineates the assumption of universal
perception in GRTwIND.
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6.1. Proof of mean-variance equivalence in the standard 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model
Let µ and Σ be the mean vector and covariance matrix of a bivarite Guassian den-
sity, and let c be a vector containing the response criteria14 on each dimension:
µ =
[
µx
µy
]
(16)
Σ =
[
σxx σxy
σxy σyy
]
(17)
c =
[
cx
cy
]
(18)
If we apply the affine transformation T + ∆, defined below, the covariance matrix
is transformed into a correlation matrix and the means are shifted with respect to the
response criteria in order to preserve the distances between the means and response
criteria in units of standard deviation.
T + ∆ =
 1√σxx 00 1√
σyy
 + cx − cx√σxxcy − cy√σyy
 (19)
Application of this transformation produces a new covariance matrix R = TΣTT
and new mean vector η = Tµ+∆. The transformed covariance matrix is the correlation
matrix:
TΣTT =
 1√σxx 00 1√
σyy
 [σxx σxyσxy σyy
]  1√σxx 00 1√
σyy
 (20)
=
 σxx√σxxσxx σxy√σxxσyyσxy√
σxxσyy
σyy√
σyyσyy

=
[
1 ρxy
ρxy 1
]
And the transformed mean vector is the vector of response criteria added to the
14If DS holds, each decision bound is equivalent to a simple response criterion.
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signed distance, in standard deviation units, between the means and response criteria:
η = Tµ + ∆ (21)
=
 1√σxx 00 1√
σyy
 [µxµy
]
+
cx − cx√σxxcy − cy√σyy

=
 µx√σxxµy√
σyy
 + cx − cx√σxxcy − cy√σyy

=
cx + µx−cx√σxxcy + µy−cy√σyy

Before applying the transformation, the signed distance between the means and the
response criteria are µx−cx√
σxx
and µy−cy√
σyy
. After applying the transformation, the means are
these values added to the response criteria. (The transformation applied to the response
criteria produces no shift; substitute cx for µx and and cy for µy in equation 21 to see
this.) Hence, the signed distances between the transformed means and the response
criteria are:
ηx − cx =
(
cx +
µx − cx√
σxx
)
− cx = µx − cx√
σxx
(22)
ηy − cy =
(
cy +
µy − cy√
σyy
)
− cy = µy − cy√
σyy
(23)
This guarantees that the integrals of the marginal densities are equivalent pre- and
post-transformation. More generally, because this transformation is invertible, it pre-
serves the model’s predicted response probabilities (Billingsley, 2012, pp. 215-216).
Therefore, for a pair of response criteria, there is a one-to-one mapping between em-
pirically equivalent bivariate Gaussian GRT perceptual distributions, one of which may
have arbitrary marginal variances and the other of which has unit marginal variances
and suitably shifted means.
As discussed above, the non-identifiability of means and marginal variances in the
2 × 2 model is often addressed by setting the marginal variances of all the perceptual
distributions equal to one (e.g., Silbert, 2012, 2014; Thomas, 2001b), and Silbert and
Thomas (2013) fixed the marginal variances equal to one in the pre-transformation
model exhibiting failures of DS.
In multi-bound models, however, the scale of the model can be established by fix-
ing the marginal variances of just one perceptual distribution, which, along with setting
the location of the model by fixing the mean vector of one distribution, allows both the
means and marginal variances of the remaining distributions to be estimated. This is be-
cause the data from concurrent ratings and n×m identification tasks have more degrees
of freedom than there are unknown variables (free parameters) in the corresponding
models.
More specifically, suppose there are n > 2 and m > 2 rating levels in a concurrent
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ratings task and associated model. The data will have 4(nm − 1) degrees of freedom,15
while the model will have 16 parameters governing the perceptual distributions,16 and
n + m − 2 decision bound (intercept) parameters. The simplest concurrent ratings data
(n = m = 3) has 32 degrees of freedom, while the corresponding model has 20 free
parameters. The degrees of freedom in the data grow multiplicatively with n and m,
while the number of free parameters in the model grows additively, so any more com-
plex concurrent ratings data and model will have more degrees of freedom than free
parameters, respectively.
Of course, a simple inequality between the degrees of freedom in the data and the
number of free parameters in the model does not guarantee identifiability. We can see
that such models are identifiable in this case by considering that the concurrent ratings
data and model may be expressed as a system of 4(nm − 1) equations with 14 + n + m
unknowns of the following form:
Pr(ai, b j|Ak, Bl) =
cyiˆ
cyi−1
cx jˆ
cx j−1
N (2)
(
µAk Bl ,ΣAk Bl
)
dydx (24)
With i, j, k, l ∈ {1, 2}, cx0 = cy0 = −∞, and cxm = cyn = ∞. Crucially, every
free parameter appears in more than one equation, since each parameter plays a role
in specifying more than one predicted response probability. For example, each of the
estimated decision bound partially specifies predicted probabilities on either side of
the bound for every perceptual distribution, and each perceptual distribution parameter
partially specifies the predicted probabilities for every response to the corresponding
stimulus.
The n × m identification task and model exhibits a similar relationship, with the
simplest data set having 72 degrees of freedom,17 while the model has 57 perceptual
distribution parameters18 and n + m − 2 decision bound parameters.19 In general, the
n×m identification data and model can be expressed as a system of nm(nm−1) equations
with 7(nm − 1) + n + m − 1 unknowns taking the same general form as the equation
given for the concurrent ratings data and model above.
6.2. GRTwIND, universal perception, and mean-variance equivalence
In GRTwIND, there is a similar, but not identical, relationship between the data and
the model. With N subjects producing data in the 2× 2 identification task, the data will
15There are nm − 1 for each of the four stimuli, since one data value is specified if the remaining nm − 1
are known, given the total number of times that each stimulus is presented.
16Three mean vectors with two free parameters each, one correlation parameter in the distribution with
fixed marginal variances, three (co)variance parameters in each of the other three distributions
17The confusion matrix is 9 × 9, so it has 9 × 8 degrees of freedom.
18one correlation parameter in a distribution with fixed mean and marginal variances, and two mean and
five (co)variance parameters in each of the other eight distributions
19There may be additional decision bound parameters if failures of DS are modeled with piecewise linear
bounds, as in, e.g., Ashby and Lee (1991), though see Silbert and Thomas (2013) for a discussion of some
important ambiguities with the specification of piecewise failures of DS
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have 12N degrees of freedom,20 while the model has 16 shared perceptual distribution
parameters21 and 6N scaling, dimension weighting, and decision bound parameters.22
Hence, there will be a system of 12N equations with 16 + 6N unknowns, again taking
the same general form as the equation given above.
The differences between GRTwIND and multi-bound models are twofold. First,
as described above, the way in which the parameters partially specify multiple pre-
dicted response probabilities differ between the two types of model. A single-subject
multi-bound model is designed to analyze a single subject’s data and predict interme-
diate (and extreme) response levels therein, whereas GRTwIND is designed to analyze
multiple subjects’ data and cannot, by defintion, predict intermediate response levels.
Second, whereas an appropriately specified single-subject multi-bound model can be
fit to a single subject’s data, if the number of subjects N ≤ 2, the number of free pa-
rameters in a GRTwIND model exceeds the degrees of freedom in the data. Hence,
GRTwIND is over-parameterized with data from fewer than three subjects, as noted by
Soto et al. (2015).
It is also worth noting that, because GRTwIND is not a multi-bound model (i.e.,
because it was designed to analyze multiple subjects’ 2 × 2 identification data), the
simultaneous identification of means and marginal variances relies, like the identifica-
tion of failures of DS, on the assumption of universal perception. The transformations
mapping between marginal variances and means given in equations 20 and 21 apply in
a straightforward manner to the parameters of a GRTwIND model after the application
of the subject-specific rotation and shear transformation Rm and Sm. Expressions for a
given subject’s mean, variance, and correlation parameters can be found by appropriate
substitutions of terms from equations 8-15 into equations 20 and 21.
We can conclude from this that, in order for the assumption of universal perception
to enable the simultaneous identification of means and marginal variances, it must also
disallow the subject- and stimulus-specific scaling of marginal variances and means
described in equations 20 and 21. Given the mathematical and empirical equivalence
of the covariance matrices and mean vectors on either side of equations 20 and 21,
it seems once again impossible that a purely mathematical justification can be found
for disallowing these transformations while allowing the variance scaling described by
Soto et al. (2015).
7. Conclusion
7.1. Testability and universal perception
Silbert and Thomas (2013) showed, in their proposition i, that simultaneous DS,
PS, and PI are not jointly testable in 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT models; the parameters are
not identifiable in a Gaussian GRT model in which DS, PS, and PI may all fail. Soto
20Each confusion matrix in the 2 × 2 task has 4 × 3 degrees of freedom
21One correlation parameter for the distribution with fixed location and scale, and two mean and three
(co)variance parameters in each of the other three distributions
22One scaling, one dimension weighting, two decision bound intercepts and two decision bound slopes
per subject
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et al. (2015) showed that Silbert & Thomas’s proposition i holds for models with multi-
ple decision bounds on each dimension if and only if the bounds on a given dimension
are parallel. In addition, it has been known for more than 20 years that the means and
marginal variances in 2 × 2 models are not both identifiable, though they are identifi-
able in concurrent ratings and n × m identification models, which we here refer to as
multi-bound models (Ashby and Lee, 1991; Ashby, 1988; Wickens, 1992). A recent
multilevel extension of GRT called GRTwIND was developed in an attempt to solve
these problems in the 2 × 2 case (Soto et al., 2015; Soto and Ashby, 2015).
Soto and colleagues argue that if the assumption of universal perception is valid,
then GRTwIND solves both problems. As described by Soto et al. (2015), universal
perception constrains the GRTwIND model so that the nature of any perceptual inter-
actions is common to all subjects. In practice, this means that the model has a single
set of perceptual distributions parameterized by mean vectors and covariance matrices.
The full GRTwIND model adds to these shared parameters a set of subject-specific scal-
ing parameters λm and κm, m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}, which modify the perceptual covariance
matrices, and subject-specific decision bounds, each of which is specified by intercept
and slope parameters.
In section 5.2, we showed that each subject’s decision bound slopes map one-to-one
onto subject-specific angles φm and ωm, which in turn define subject-specific rotation
and shear matrices Rm and Sm (see equations 8-15). These one-to-one mappings prove
that GRTwIND with subject-specific failures of decisional separability is mathemati-
cally, and thereby empirically, equivalent to a model in which decisional separability
holds for all subjects and in which universal perception is violated. Finally, we showed
that means and marginal variances are not, in general, simultaneously identifiable in
2 × 2 GRT models, including the GRTwIND model transformed by subject-specific
rotations and shears.
Universal perception is defined as shared (failures of) perceptual independence and
perceptual separability, but none of the dimensional interactions defined in the GRT
framework are directly observable. Indeed, the greatest strength of GRT is its utility in
allowing us to draw inferences about unobservable dimensional interactions from ob-
servable data. The mathematical facts described above delineate precisely what univer-
sal perception must consist of. Per the original description of GRTwIND, universal per-
ception allows subject-specific marginal variance scaling. The results described in this
paper indicate that universal perception must also disallow the subject-specific rotation
and shear transformations described in equations 8-15 and the subject- and stimulus-
specific mean and marginal variance scaling transformations described in equations 20
and 21.
These results establish the complete mathematical and empirical equivalence of
GRTwIND and a model with subject-specific rotation and shear transformations. Hence,
the pattern of allowed and disallowed transformations described above can only be jus-
tified by non-mathematical means or by empirical means other than the 2 × 2 identi-
fication data that GRTwIND was designed to model. Any possible validation of the
assumption of universal perception depends on such justification. Of course, validation
of universal perception may one day be found in data from other tasks and models.
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7.2. Dimensional orthogonality and perceptual primacy
We conclude by proposing that the full suite of results concerning the (lack of)
identifiability and testability of DS, PS, and PI in GRT models, and of universal per-
ception in GRTwIND, points toward an important, and thus far incompletely addressed
issue at the heart of the GRT framework, namely the orthogonality of the modeled
perceptual dimensions. From the initial development of GRT, it was recognized that
orthogonality of perceptual dimensions is intimately intertwined with perceptual and
decisional dimensional interactions (Ashby and Townsend, 1986). Indeed, Ashby and
Townsend (1986) discuss the difficulties related to testing dimensional orthogonality
in some detail. Nonetheless, the full import of this assumption seems only now, three
decades later, to be fully understood.
As discussed above, in order for a GRT model’s parameters to be identifiable, the
location and scale of the model must be fixed, and this is typically done by setting one
mean vector equal to the origin and by setting one perceptual distribution’s marginal
variances equal to one. The recent mathematical developments in the GRT framework,
including those discussed above, indicate that we must also fix the orthogonality of the
perceptual dimensions.
Without describing it explicitly in these terms, Silbert and Thomas (2013) recom-
mend fixing the orthogonality of the perceptual dimensions by assuming that decisional
separability holds in a single-subject 2 × 2 model. We assume that it would also be
possible to fix dimensional orthogonality by constraining a subset of perceptual distri-
bution parameters (e.g., by setting µx,A1B1 = µx,A1B2 and µy,A1B1 = µy,A2B1 ). However, as
noted by Silbert and Thomas (2013), decisional separability can always be induced in
the 2 × 2 model, whereas perceptual separability can only be induced via linear trans-
formations from a narrowly circumscribed subset of failures of perceptual separability.
Any constraints on perceptual distribution parameters serving to fix dimensional or-
thogonality should be carefully designed to take these facts into account. Assuming
that decisional separability holds has the benefit of being simple to implement and un-
derstand, though we acknowledge that arguments based on simplicity do not provide
an overwhelmingly strong rationale for preferring one or another approach to fixing
dimensional orthogonality.
The analysis described above can be interpreted as another reflection of the need to
fix the orthogonality of the perceptual dimensions in GRT models. As with the standard
2×2 and single-subject multi-bound models, the location, scale, and orthogonality must
be fixed in GRTwIND. Also as with the standard 2×2 and multi-bound models, it seems
simplest to us to ensure orthogonality by fixing decision bounds to induce decisional
separability. Although it may be possible to find a suitable restriction on a subset of
perceptual distribution parameters to fix dimensional orthogonality in GRTwIND, the
fact that perceptual parameters are shared across subjects seems likely to complicate
matters. Again, though, it is important to keep in mind that neither simplicity nor inter-
pretability provide anything more than a pragmatic justification for fixing orthogonality
by constraining decisional rather than perceptual parameters.
It’s worth noting that the other recent multilevel extension of GRT is affected by the
need to fix the orthogonality of the dimensions even more strongly than is GRTwIND.
Silbert (2012, 2014) used a multilevel model in which each subject’s data is modeled
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by a fully parameterized 2 × 2 Gaussian GRT model, with group level parameters gov-
erning variation across subjects with respect to each subject-level parameter. Whereas
GRTwIND may solve two important GRT-specific testability and identifiability prob-
lems if the assumption of universal perception holds, the multilevel model described
by Silbert (2012, 2014) cannot solve either, regardless of the validity of any underlying
assumptions.
With respect to universal perception, our results showing that GRTwIND is mathe-
matically equivalent to a model in which decisional separability holds for all subjects
(section 5) and in which all marginal variances are equal to one (section 6) go be-
yond the issue of dimensional orthogonality. Specifically, the assumption of universal
perception, which consists of a strong set of constraints on allowable subject-specific
modifications of perceptual distribution properties, seems to be concerned less with
dimensional orthogonality and more with dimensional primacy.
Establishing the perceptual primacy of a particular set of dimensions demands evi-
dence that is not simple to come by. For example, Melara and Marks (1990) argue that
patterns of change in the magnitude of Garner interference across levels of physical di-
mension orientations provide evidence of perceptual primacy (or lack thereof), but they
analyzed the perception of well-defined (orthogonal) physical dimensions (acoustic
frequency and intensity). By way of contrast, assuming perceptual primacy, Soto et al.
(2015) analyzed dimensions with no straightforward physical definitions (facial iden-
tity and neutral vs sad emotional expressions), and Soto and Ashby (2015) analyzed
novel dimensions based on morphed faces, stating that “there are no psychologically-
meaningful directions in a space constructed this way” (p. 110). Similarly, Silbert
(2012, 2014) used GRT to probe interactions between dimensions defined with respect
to abstract linguistic categories.
Evidence for perceptual primacy with respect to novel dimensions may be partic-
ularly difficult to find, as unsupervised learning seems to play a role in the creation of
ad-hoc perceptual dimensions (Jones and Goldstone, 2013). When considering the pri-
macy of particular dimensions and assumptions of universal perception, it is also worth
keeping in mind that holistic vs analytic cognition may vary across cultures (Nisbett
et al., 2001).
To the extent that dimensional primacy and/or universal perception requires shared
perceptual correlations across subjects, one could argue against the rotation and shear
transformations described above. However, it is not clear that the shared perceptual
correlations of Soto et al.’s universal perception is a valid assumption in all cases. For
example, multilevel 2 × 2 GRT models fit to speech perception data exhibit substantial
variation of perceptual distribution correlations across subjects (Silbert, 2012, 2014).
Similarly large differences in correlations across subjects have been reported in 2 × 2
and 3×3 identification data from face recognition tasks (Thomas, 2001b; Thomas et al.,
2015). The assumption that the means and variance ratios are constant across subjects
seems to be similarly suspect (e.g., Silbert, 2012, 2014; Thomas et al., 2015).
In conclusion, it seems clear to us that an independent validation of the assumption
of universal perception as originally described by Soto et al. (2015), and as elaborated
on here, would represent important progress in the GRT framework.
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